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INSIDE THE WOMB: INTERPRETING THE FERGUSON CASE
SAMANTHA WEYRAUCH*
I. INTRODUCTION
The rapid and recent advancements in prenatal care, combined with an in-
crease in knowledge of fetal development, have led to a higher scrutiny of
women’s activities during pregnancy.1 When a pregnant woman’s behavior en-
dangers her fetus’ life through active or passive conduct, “fetal abuse” is
deemed to have occurred. The specific problem of fetal abuse involving moth-
ers that abuse drugs is highly controversial, and courts are often called upon to
provide guidance and resolution on these sensitive issues.
The government has a standard policy advocating the prevention of fetal
abuse, but its recent intervention has raised serious and conflicting constitu-
tional issues. In 2001, in Ferguson v. City of Charleston, the United States Supreme
Court considered whether involuntary drug tests performed on pregnant
women without their consent violated the Fourth Amendment of the Constitu-
tion.2 This was the first case in which the Supreme Court explicitly recognized
Fourth Amendment rights in the context of pregnant women who are addicted
to drugs.
Part II of this commentary explores the history of maternal-fetal conflict in
the context of drug addiction. Part III examines the landmark case of Ferguson v.
City of Charleston as it relates to the Fourth Amendment, and its implications for
treatment of pregnant women. Part IV discusses other complex constitutional
issues, specifically those involving the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Pro-
cess Clause. These issues are usually raised when a state actor attempts to en-
force fetal rights while the fetus is still inside the womb.3
II. FETAL RIGHTS
It is a popular belief amongst physicians that the relationship between a
mother and her unborn child is unique. While the medical profession holds this
view, it has fueled the conflict between pregnant women and their fetuses by
controlling medical procedures specifically targeted to benefit the fetus, and by
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1. See, e.g., Chau Lam, Teen who hid her newborn in closet may get him back, HOUS. CHRON., Oct.
15, 1997, at A12 (charges filed against a 17-year-old girl who failed to get prenatal or postnatal care
after her baby was delivered prematurely in her bedroom).
2. 532 U.S. 67 (2001).
3. States may attempt to police the behaviors of the mothers-to-be before the fetus is born.
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viewing the fetus as a separate patient.4 When the physician views the fetus as a
separate patient, the physician elevates the fetus to a status above that of the
mother, creating an inherent conflict.5 This conflict is further magnified when a
woman and her fetus have different needs.6 A New England Journal of Medi-
cine article suggests that many physicians think it is proper to dishonor a pa-
tient’s choice to consent to, or refuse a medical procedure, when that choice
could endanger the life of the fetus.7 In some cases, physicians have asked
courts to override the informed decision of the pregnant woman, and courts
have almost always ordered the medical procedure in question.8
The law of fetal rights is deeply rooted in the common law. Traditionally, a
mother and her fetus were thought to constitute one person, even though the
law had accounted for the fetus separately for centuries.9 The most famous case
upholding the traditional view, and refusing to recognize fetal rights, was
Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton in 1884.10 In Dietrich, a woman sued the city
of Northampton for damages to her unborn child resulting from the woman’s
fall on a defective sidewalk.11 The child was born prematurely and subsequently
died. The court dismissed the claim, holding that although common law recog-
nized the causing of miscarriage or death of a “quickened” fetus as a crime, no
civil cause of action was available.12 Dietrich thus stood for the proposition that a
fetus unable to live outside of its mother’s womb had no standing to sue.
For six decades, the holding in Dietrich stood unchallenged. Courts de-
clined to recognize fetal rights, but did act to protect third party interests, such
as the interest of the fetus’ father in obtaining compensation for his loss of prop-
erty, and the interest of the mother in receiving compensation for the physical
4. Helene M. Cole, Legal Interventions During Pregnancy, 264 JAMA 2663, 2663 (1990). For ex-
ample, a pregnant patient may refuse to submit to a cesarean section when her doctor strongly be-
lieves that the procedure would be in the best interests of her unborn child. Id. In addition, a preg-
nant woman may refuse a necessary blood transfusion for the sake of her fetus on the basis of
religion. Id.
5. Deirdre Moira Condit, Fetal Personhood: Political Identity Under Construction, in EXPECTING
TROUBLE 28 (Patricia Boling ed., 1995) (stressing that in modern times the fetus is often treated as a
second patient, but not necessarily as a lesser one). Medical specialties such as “fetal health” can
also contribute to the notion of the fetus being the primary patient. Id.
6. Id. The development of medical technology is likely to increase the exposure of the fetus
and add to the conflicting needs of the expectant woman and her fetus.
7. Veronika E.B. Kolder et al., Court-Ordered Obstetrical Interventions, 316 NEW ENG. J. MED.
1192, 1192 (1987); see also Janet Gallagher, Prenatal Invasions and Interventions: What’s Wrong With Fetal
Rights, 10 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 9, 10 (1987).
8. This has generally been with regard to cesarean sections. Kolder, supra note 7, at 1192; see
Gallagher, supra note 7 (restraining woman with ankle and wrist cuffs); see also Raleigh Fitkin-Paul
Morgan Hosp. v. Anderson, 201 A.2d 537, 537 (N.J. 1964) (ordering a blood transfusion to save the
life of woman or unborn child over woman’s religious objections).
9. Kristen Burgess, Protective Custody: Will It Eradicate Fetal Abuse and Lead to the Perfect Womb?,
35 HOUS. L. REV. 227, 240 (1998).
10. Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton, 138 Mass. 114, 114 (1884).
11. Id.
12. Id.
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injuries she sustained during pregnancy.13 After Bonbrest v. Kotz in 1946, courts
began to grant limited rights to the fetus.14
In Bonbrest, the fetus was injured by the physician during delivery.15 The
court emphasized that the fetus was viable at the time of injury, and held that to
deny recovery to a child for prenatal injuries would be to allow a wrong without
a remedy.16 The court rejected the idea of a fetus as only “part” of the mother, at
least for purposes of recovery against a third party.17 Curiously, the court or-
dered compensation for all three victims—the injured child and the two par-
ents—without explicitly recognizing that the fetus possessed rights separate
from, or potentially in conflict with, those of the mother.18 Nevertheless, by
holding that the child was viable and had standing before the court, the Bonbrest
court helped to support the idea that fetal rights may exist even earlier in a
woman’s pregnancy as advances in medical science move the viability date
closer to the date of conception.19
Finally, in 1960, the doctrine of fetal rights was revisited in Smith v. Bren-
nan.20 The court held that justice requires recognition of a child’s legal right to
begin life with a sound mind and body.21 In Brennan, a fetus was allowed to re-
cover against a third party for injuries it suffered in an automobile accident.22 In
Stallman v. Youngquist in 1988, a different court declined to extend the notion of
a child’s right to begin life with a sound mind and body into the womb itself.23
The court rejected the notion of a fetus’s right to be protected against prenatal
injury.24 Decades later, in Ferguson v. City of Charleston, the Supreme Court was
similarly asked to consider whether a fetus has a right to be protected against
prenatal injury resulting from the mother’s conduct.
III. THE SUPREME COURT SPEAKS: FERGUSON V. CITY OF CHARLESTON
For decades, the nation’s primary response to the problem of illicit drug
use has been an escalation of federal, state, and local law enforcement activities
aimed at discouraging drug use through punishment of the users.25 In recent
13. See generally Burgess, supra note 9, at 241-48 (describing in detail fetal rights under property,
tort and criminal law).
14. 65 F. Supp. 138, 138 (D.C. 1946).
15. Id. at 139.
16. Id. at 141.
17. Id. at 140.
18. Id.
19. Kristen Barrett, Prosecuting Pregnant Addicts for Dealing to the Unborn, 33 ARIZ. L. REV. 221,
223 (1991).
20. Smith v. Brennan, 157 A.2d 497, 497 (N.J. 1960).
21. Id. at 503.
22. Id. at 504.
23. 531 N.E.2d 355, 355 (Ill. 1988).
24. Id. The court held that to recognize a legal right of a fetus to begin life with a sound mind
and body assertable against a mother would make a pregnant woman the guarantor of the mind and
body of her child at birth. Id. The court refused recovery, noting that this legal duty had never be-
fore been recognized. Id. at 359.
25. Patricia A. Sexton, Imposing Criminal Sanctions on Pregnant Drug Users: Throwing the Baby Out
With the Bath Water, 32 WASHBURN L.J. 410, 424 (1993).
WEYRAUCH_FMT.DOC 06/10/03 9:06 AM
84 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY Volume 9:81 2002
years, the public has increasingly favored holding women criminally responsi-
ble if they use drugs while pregnant.26 Generally, there are three categories of
judicial responses when dealing with perinatal27 substance abuse in the courts:
(1) rejecting the claim of jurisdiction on all grounds; (2) protecting the infant
only after its birth; and (3) state intervention before the birth of the infant.28 In
Ferguson v. City of Charleston, a state hospital asked the Supreme Court to take
the third route, to protect fetuses from harmful drugs—even at the cost of the
mother’s liberty.29
In Ferguson, obstetrics patients at a public hospital, who resembled a sus-
pected drug use profile, were subjected to urine tests for cocaine, without in-
forming the women of the testing.30 According to the hospital policy, a pregnant
woman fit the profile for suspected cocaine use if she met one or more of the
following criteria suggesting the use of drugs:
1. No prenatal care
2. Later prenatal care after 24 weeks gestation
3. Incomplete prenatal care
4. Abruptio placentae
5. Intrauterine fetal death
6. Preterm labor of no obvious cause
7. IUGR (intrauterine growth retardation)
8. Previously know drug use or alcohol abuse
9. Unexplained congenital anomalies31
The hospital policy also provided that the urine samples taken from pregnant
women meeting the profile were to be collected in a way that would maintain
the chain of custody, presumably to ensure that the results could be used in sub-
sequent criminal proceedings against the woman.32 In the event that a woman’s
urine tested positive for cocaine, the hospital informed the police, who subse-
quently threatened to arrest the woman if she did not agree to participate in a
drug treatment program.33
The lower courts approved the hospital’s testing policy, relying on Su-
preme Court precedents in which “suspicionless” drug tests, although qualify-
ing as searches within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, were justified by
26. Id. at 411. Across the nation, prosecutors have used creative applications of laws in exis-
tence to bring cases against pregnant drug addicts which include child abuse, neglect, vehicular
homicide, encouraging the delinquency of a minor, involuntary manslaughter, drug trafficking, fail-
ure to provide child support and assault with a deadly weapon. Id. at 412-14.
27. “Perinatal” is defined as the period beginning after the twenty-eighth week of pregnancy
through the twenty-eighth day following birth, and “prenatal” is broadly defined as the time after
conception that precedes birth. Taber’s Cyclopedic Medical Dictionary 1469, 1587 (Clayton L. Tho-
mas, M.D., ed., 1993).
28. Sexton, supra note 25, at 414-15.
29. City of Charleston v. Ferguson, 532 U.S. 67, 67 (2001).
30. Id.
31. Id. at 71 n.4 (the policy involved testing patients meeting one or more of the hospital’s nine
criteria through use of a urine drug screen).
32. Id. at 73.
33. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 71-73. Ten women who received obstetrical care were arrested after
testing positive for cocaine. Id. at 73.
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a “special need.”34 The District Court stated that a “special need” justification is
critical where warrantless searches are at issue.35 However, in each of the Su-
preme Court cases relied upon by the lower court, the “special need” advanced
as a justification for warrantless searches, or those based on individualized sus-
picion, went beyond the state’s general interest in law enforcement.”36
The Supreme Court held that because the hospital was public, its staff
members were government actors subject to the strictures of the Fourth
Amendment.37 The Supreme Court agreed with the District Court’s conclusion
that testing urine samples from pregnant patients for cocaine and reporting
positive results to the police constituted a “search” within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment, but rejected the view that the searches were justified by a
“special need.”38 Unless the mother consented, the test itself and the act of re-
porting of a positive test result to police were considered to be unreasonable
searches, despite the policy’s law enforcement purpose.39 The Supreme Court
rejected the hospital’s assertion that the policy was designed to serve a “special
need” to coerce pregnant women to participate in substance abuse treatment,
declaring:
[W]hile the ultimate goal of the program may well have been to get the women
in question into substance abuse treatment and off of drugs, the immediate ob-
jective of the searches was to generate evidence for law enforcement purposes in
order to reach that goal.40
Ferguson v. City of Charleston is the first Supreme Court case involving a
maternal-fetal conflict in an addiction context, articulating that pregnant women
cannot be “searched” without probable cause under the Constitution. This may
be the first of many cases in which the Supreme Court is asked the walk the fine
line between what a woman does to her own body and what she does to her un-
born child.
IV. OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES—THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
AND THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE
The constitutional problems associated with state efforts to identify and
punish pregnant women who have ingested controlled substances are not lim-
ited to search and seizure within the Fourth Amendment. State action taken
against women suspected of prenatal substance abuse also raises questions un-
der both the Equal Protection Clause and Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
34. Id. at 73 (citing various cases in which the Supreme Court has permitted warrantless
searches because of special needs including Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Action, 515 U.S. 646 (1995) and
Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 602 (1989)).
35. City of Charleston v. Ferguson, 532 U.S. 67, 75 (2001).
36. Id. at 73.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 76.
39. Id. at 72.
40. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 82-83. Respondents argued that their ultimate purpose in protecting
the health of both mother and child is a beneficent one. Id. at 81. However, the Court held that the
policy plainly revealed that its purpose was not actually distinguishable from the state’s interest in
crime control. Id. (citing Indianapolis v. Edmond, 121 S. Ct. 447 (2000)).
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Amendment. When either clause has been raised in the context of pregnancy,
courts have consistently followed the Supreme Court decision of Roe v. Wade41
and its progeny.42
A. Equal Protection Clause
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that
no state shall “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws.”43 According to some commentators, the Equal Protection Clause is
considered to be the “single most important concept in the Constitution for the
protection of individual rights,”44 because it protects against unlimited govern-
mental intrusion on those rights.45 Equal protection principles recognize that
most legislation classifies individuals differently in order to promote various
legislative objectives. This classification system may infringe on the interests of
an individual or a class of individuals.46 Thus it has been argued that the Equal
Protection Clause “measure[s] the validity” of state law classifications.47
Kristen Burgess writes, “Courts must consider whether regulating preg-
nancy in a manner that deprives women of liberty in order to protect fetuses in-
fringes on the mother’s autonomy during pregnancy to the degree that it vio-
lates the Equal Protection Clause.”48 Burgess states that those opposed to
criminalizing a pregnant woman’s behavior believe that the punishment “vio-
lates the equal protection clause, because only the rights of the female partici-
pant in the procreative process are infringed.”49 Also, some suggest that state
intervention in this context disproportionately burdens women.50
In Roe, the Supreme Court held that a fetus is not a “person” within the
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution,51 even though the
court recognized the state’s interest in protecting the fetus in the third trimes-
ter.52 Since Roe, a pregnant woman’s right of privacy has remained intact. In
1992, the Supreme Court in Planned Parenthood v. Casey altered the trimester
framework under Roe and emphasized the state’s interest in the promotion of
41. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 113 (1973).
42. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 833 (1992); see also Cynthia L. Glaze,
Combating Prenatal Substance Abuse: The State’s Current Approach and the Novel Approach of Court-
Ordered Protective Custody of the Fetus, 80 MARQ. L. REV. 793, 795 (1997).
43. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
44. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 524 (3d ed. 1986).
45. Burgess, supra note 9, at 239; see also Russell W. Galloway, Jr., Basic Equal Protection Analysis,
29 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 121, 121 (1989) (commenting that the equal protection clause protects racial
minorities, women, resident aliens, and illegitimate children from discriminatory treatment).
46. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996) (commenting that equal protection must co-
exist with the practical necessity of legislative classifications); Burgess, supra note 9, at 239.
47. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 59 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring).
48. Burgess, supra note 9, at 239.
49. Annotation, Developments in the Law-Medical Technology and the Law, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1519,
1565 (1990) [hereinafter Developments]; see Burgess, supra note 9, at 239-40 (drawing attention to the
fact that fathers are not being penalized for smoking tobacco in the presence of pregnant women de-
spite societal recognition that second-hand smoke is dangerous to non-smokers and to fetuses).
50. Burgess, supra note 9, at 240.
51. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158-59 (1973).
52. Id. at 164-65.
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potential life.53 In Casey, the Court held in favor of “informed consent require-
ments,” a twenty-four hour waiting period, and parental consent for minors.
The Court also adopted Justice O’Connor’s “undue burden test” as the measure
of future restrictions.54 Both Roe and Casey have been cited as a basis for recog-
nition of fetal rights, but women’s rights advocates and fetal rights advocates
disagree over whether the state interest recognized in these two cases extends
beyond the abortion context.55
Women’s rights advocates interpret Roe and its progeny narrowly, ad-
vancing the notion that those cases only reach the issue of abortion.56 These
groups believe that the Supreme Court identified the life and health of the
mother as factors limiting the state’s interest in potential life.57 It has been sug-
gested that even if Roe can be read as recognizing fetal rights, these rights are
always subordinate to the mother’s right to life and health.58 These advocates
hold the view that “any rights a fetus may have are simply not compelling
enough to override the pregnant woman’s clear and uncontested rights in mak-
ing decisions about her pregnant body.”59
Fetal rights advocates, on the other hand, broadly interpret Roe and its
progeny as implying that the state’s interest in potential life exists at conception
and not at the point of viability.60 Their belief that the fetus’ independent rights
exist even before viability was affirmed by the Supreme Court in Webster v. Re-
productive Health Services61 and Casey.62 These advocates also believe that the two
cases justify the extension of the rights already afforded a fetus to other situa-
tions, such as those where the fetus’ mother is involved in substance abuse.63
Some fetal rights advocates take the position that a woman’s right to abuse her
body “stops at the border of her womb.”64
A woman’s Fourteenth Amendment rights under maternal drug use stat-
utes, both civil and criminal, are often compared to a woman’s right to an abor-
tion.65 In 1973, the Supreme Court in Roe held that women had the legal right to
have an abortion. The right was held to be “fundamental” and emanated from
53. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 873 (1992). Justice O’Connor commented that it
must be remembered that Roe clearly speaks about establishing a woman’s liberty but also about the
State’s important and legitimate interest in potential life.” Id. at 871.
54. Id. at 876-77.
55. Glaze, supra note 42, at 796.
56. Alicia Ouellette, New Medical Technology: A Chance to Reexamine Court-Ordered Medical Proce-
dures During Pregnancy, 57 ALB. L. REV. 927, 945-48 (1994).
57. Id. at 945-46.
58. Id. at 947.
59. Id. at 948.
60. Glaze, supra note 42, at 796.
61. Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490, 490 (1989) (upholding a Missouri
statute granting the fetus “all the rights, privileges, and immunities available to other persons, citi-
zens, and residents”); see MO. REV. STAT. § 1.205.2 (2001).
62. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
63. Glaze, supra note 42, at 797.
64. Id.
65. Cheri Hass, State v. Gray: De-Criminalization of Maternal Drug Abuse or a Momentary Reprieve?,
25 U. TOL. L. REV. 1013, 1025 (1995).
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the broader constitutional right to privacy.66 Importantly, a woman’s right to
privacy and bodily autonomy was not considered absolute.67 The Court found
that the state has a compelling interest in the well-being of a fetus during the
woman’s third trimester of pregnancy.68 Those favoring fetal rights also advance
the position that there is no constitutional right to abuse controlled substances.69
Thus, they argue that the state may intervene in a pregnancy to protect the pos-
sibility of future life without treading on the Fourteenth Amendment right of
privacy.70
The penumbral privacy recognized in Roe v. Wade also contains a right of
bodily integrity.71 The doctrine of bodily integrity has been treated in a respect-
ful way by the courts.72 The Supreme Court has stated, “No right is held more
sacred, or is more carefully guarded by the common law than the right of the
individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all re-
straint and interference by others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority
of law.”73 The right to be free from non-consensual bodily invasion forms the
basis of the informed consent doctrine.74 The privacy strand of the right to bod-
ily integrity has emerged in cases permitting patients or their guardians to ref-
use medical treatment.75 Furthermore, courts have recognized that the right
against bodily interference extends to medical procedures intended to benefit
another.76
Erosion of the right to bodily integrity and autonomy has been permitted in
the cases of certain compelling state interests such as preserving life, preventing
suicide, maintaining the integrity of the medical profession, and protecting third
parties.77 These state interests do exist in the context of maternal drug abusers.78
Pregnant women who abuse drugs are not forced to behave in ways which pro-
tect their fetuses; however, such women can be penalized for harming their fe-
tuses.79 Scholar Cheri Hass observed that “the state is not requiring physical in-
66. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973).
67. Id. at 154.
68. Id. at 163. The court chose the third trimester because it believed that to be the point at
which the fetus became viable.
69. Hass, supra note 65, at 1025-26; see State v. Gray, 584 N.E.2d 710, 714 (Ohio 1992) (Wright, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that a child has the legal right to begin life without the burden of injuries in-
flicted before it is born).
70. Hass, supra note 65.
71. Derk B.K. VanRaalte, Punitive Policies: Constitutional Hazards of Non-Consensual Testing of
Women for Prenatal Drug Use, 5 HEALTH MATRIX 443, 466 (1995).
72. Id. The right to be free from bodily invasion originated in the common law. Id.; see Nor-
wood Hosp. v. Munoz, 564 N.E.2d 1017, 1021 (Mass. 1991).
73. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968).
74. Bonnie I. Robin-Vergeer, The Problem of the Drug-Exposed Newborn: A Return to Principled In-
tervention, 42 STAN. L. REV. 745, 788-98 (1990); see, e.g., In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985).
75. See, e.g., Rennie v. Klein, 458 U.S. 1119 (1982); Superintendent v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417
(1977); In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (1976).
76. McFall v. Shimp, 10 Pa.D. & C.3d 90 (1978) (holding that there was no legal basis to compel
a man to undergo a bone marrow extraction to save a terminally ill cousin).
77. Superintendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 425 (Mass. 1977).
78. Hass, supra note 65, at 1028.
79. Id.
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trusion into a woman’s body and the woman is not being forced to undergo an
unwanted biological process, as the case would be with criminalizing abor-
tions.”80 In addition, forcing a pregnant woman to quit using drugs is often
viewed as socially acceptable because it potentially helps both the woman and
her fetus.81
B. Due Process
In addition to a woman’s right to equal protection under the law, her due
process rights could be violated if the state’s intervention unduly burdened her
reproductive rights. Due Process involves a tension between the state and the
individual, requiring that people have notice of the laws that they are alleged to
have violated. In Casey, the “undue burden standard” was found to be the ap-
propriate method by which to reconcile the state’s interest with the woman’s
right of constitutionally protected liberty.82 The undue burden standard left the
doors wide open for state regulation.83
In Roe, the Supreme Court asserted that the state may restrict abortion after
viability is established only if the mother’s life or health is not affected. Roe does
not entertain the option of enforced treatment to promote fetal health.”84 Some
suggest that the effect of that silence operates as a “waiver” of her maternal due
process rights.85 James Nocon states, “In sum, once a woman elects to waive her
right to abortion and to carry the fetus to term, she is no longer free to take ac-
tion that would endanger her fetus.”86 This argument of a waiver of the due
process rights by the pregnant woman can be disputed in three ways: (1) a
woman may elect to terminate her pregnancy to preserve her health; (2) no ac-
tual waiver can occur until after the point of viability; and (3) even if the mother
decides to carry the baby to term, she does not waive her right to conduct labor
and delivery in the manner of her choosing.87 Additionally, and more impor-
tantly, no cases have established a woman’s legal duty to accept any risk to her
health or body for the sake of her fetus.88
In Casey, the Supreme Court recognized “that the State has a legitimate in-
terest from the outset of the pregnancy in protecting the health of the woman
and the life of the fetus that may become a child.”89 However, those against po-
licing the behavior of pregnant women stress that the state’s interest does not
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 876 (1992).
83. Hass, supra note 65, at 1025.
84. James J. Nocon, Physicians and Maternal-Fetal Conflicts: Duties, Rights and Responsibilities, 5 J.
L. & HEALTH 1, 20 (1991).
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. (stating that the “waiver” position is ineffective on three premises).
88. Id.; see Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetrics & Gynecology, 476 U.S. 747 (1986)
(striking down a Pennsylvania law that required a woman to accept an increased medical risk to
save her viable fetus); Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979) (striking down a law requiring a
mother, in her second trimester, to undergo a mini-cesarean section because it offered the best op-
portunity for the fetus to be born alive).
89. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992).
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reach the level of overriding the mother’s due process rights.90 Commentators
argue that even if the state’s interest in fetuses was compelling enough to permit
burdening women’s rights, the regulation that the states are trying to impose on
pregnant women are not tailored to survive strict scrutiny.91
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Ferguson marks the first time the Supreme
Court has attempted to mediate in the war between advocates for drug-addicted
pregnant women and advocates for the fetuses they carry. This landmark deci-
sion stands for the proposition that even when a pregnant woman is addicted to
illegal substances, her status as a constitutionally protected individual is not to
be compromised through drug testing without probable cause or her consent.
The government of this country should not be permitted to police its pregnant
citizens through their umbilical cord.
Treatment of such women is also very difficult. Treatment programs for
substance-addicted mothers are almost non-existent,92 so it is no surprise that the
number of drug-addicted newborns continues to rise. Often, the more preferen-
tial treatment options for female drug addicts, such as residential treatments, are
the most difficult to obtain.93 Treatment options are even more limited for preg-
nant women. Public drug treatment programs are an option for female addicts,
but it is not uncommon for the programs to deny or expel the women once they
are found to be pregnant.94 Sadly, in the case of pregnant women drug addicts,
the laws of our country aim to uncover substance abuse not for the purpose of
prevention through treatment, but for the purpose of penalizing the pregnant
woman for her conduct.
The legal issues raised in Ferguson cannot be said to be fully resolved since
advances in medical technology are to be expected, and their impact on mater-
nal and fetal rights cannot be predicted at this time. However, we must be care-
ful not to use these medical advances as a weapon against pregnant women,
who bring our society’s children into the world.
90. Developments, supra note 49, at 1561.
91. Id. at 1564.
92. Sexton, supra note 25, at 424.
93. Id. at 424.
94. Id.; see also Nora S. Gustavsson, Drug Exposed Infants and Their Mothers: Facts, Myths, and
Needs, 16 SOCIAL WORK IN HEALTH CARE 87, 97 (1992).
